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VALUE CREATION BY BUSINESS LAWYERS: WHERE ARE WE
AND WHERE ARE WE GOING?
ELIZABETH POLLMAN*
ABSTRACT
This is a transcript of Professor Elizabeth Pollman’s remarks for the
“Value Creation by Business Lawyers in the 21st Century” panel at the 2014
AALS Annual Meeting. The panel commemorated the 30th anniversary of
Ronald Gilson’s article, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing. Professor Pollman’s remarks examined the influence of the Gilson
article and potential areas for future work in light of regulatory and technological
changes affecting transactional lawyering as well as the rise of in-house counsel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I’m delighted to participate in celebrating the 30th anniversary of
Professor Ron Gilson’s groundbreaking article, Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing.1 Professor Gilson’s ideas, and the
questions he posed in this seminal article, have had remarkable staying power.
On a personal note, as an alumna of Stanford Law School, I feel I directly
benefited from some of the important ideas in Professor Gilson’s article, as I had
the opportunity to take coursework in corporate theory, deals, and finance, and
was exposed to the idea that business lawyers could expand the pie—that is,
increase the value of a transaction net of legal fees.2 My brief comments today

* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks to Eric Gouvin, Therese
Maynard, and Afra Afsharipour for organizing and moderating this panel at the 2014 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).
1
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE
L.J. 239 (1984).
2
Id. at 243.
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examine the influence of Professor Gilson’s article and offer some modest
thoughts for the future.
Fundamentally, the Value Creation article asked two core questions: what
do business lawyers do and do they increase the value of the transaction?3 In
identifying the value-enhancing activities of business lawyers, Professor Gilson
took the perspective of overall transaction value—transactional lawyering that
expands the pie rather than simply distributes it. He attempted to evaluate
whether there is a “purely private ordering” role for business lawyers because of
his observation at the time that “business lawyers frequently function in a world
in which regulation has made few inroads.”4 That is, he didn’t rely on how
lawyers might minimize regulatory interference in showing how business lawyers
create value.
With these goals, and the acknowledgement of measurement problems,
Professor Gilson hypothesized that business lawyers might create value by acting
as “transaction cost engineers.”5 Specifically, he looked to the assumptions on
which capital asset pricing theory relies, that there are no transaction costs or
informational disparities and that parties have the same expectations and time
horizons.6 He then suggested business lawyers might create value by minimizing
these real-world deviations to bring transactions, which are the transfer of capital
assets, closer to the economic model of pricing accuracy.7 In other words,
business lawyers create value by providing “a transactional structure which
reduces transaction costs and therefore results in more accurate asset pricing.”8
He thus linked transaction cost economics with his transaction cost engineer
concept, asserting further that business lawyers are the primary players who can
design structures and mechanisms to create transaction value.9 He tested this
hypothesis by “reading the tracks that were left” by business lawyers in a
corporate acquisition agreement, finding earn-out provisions, representations and
warranties, and opinions of counsel, for instance, as examples of lawyers
remedying market failures and creating value.10
Finally, he examined the implications of these ideas for the legal
profession and legal education. Why have lawyers dominated the transaction cost
3

Id. at 241-43.
Id. at 247.
5
Id. at 247-48, 253.
6
Id. at 252-54.
7
Id. at 254-55. The basic idea of the capital assets pricing model is that in an efficient market
assets will be valued by their expected return and systematic risk. Id.
8
Id. at 255.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 256. Part of this explanation also engaged with the idea of lawyers as reputational
intermediaries, building on important contemporaneous work by Professor Gilson and Professor
Reinier Kraakman. Id. at 289-90 (citing Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984)).
4
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engineer role and how does the profession remain competitive vis-à-vis other
professions like banking and accounting? Here, Professor Gilson reintroduced
the existence of regulatory influences to explain the dominance of lawyers as
transaction cost engineers, and asserted that if business lawyers understood their
function better, they’d be better at it and more successful in competing with other
professions.11 As for legal education, the article suggested teaching theory of
private ordering through finance and transaction cost economics in order to
facilitate practice.12
II. WHERE ARE WE?
One of the best ways I can think of to commemorate and honor Professor
Gilson’s Value Creation article is to examine its influence. As John Quincy
Adams said, “If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more
and become more, you are a leader.” By this measure, and no doubt by others,
Professor Gilson has surely been a leader. He wrote about what business lawyers
do at a time when others weren’t devoting much attention to this part of the legal
profession or this type of inquiry. This is one thing that has certainly changed in
the past 30 years. Many scholars have since been inspired to expand upon
Professor Gilson’s narrative of the role of business lawyers and the value they
add. At the same time, scholars have also challenged aspects of the value
creation story, which has also lead to further insights. And, of course,
particularly in recent years, legal academics have more deeply engaged in debate
on the future of legal education, including how to effectively train business
lawyers. It’s these areas of development or influence that I’d like to briefly touch
upon before attempting to add a little food for thought. I’ll loosely categorize the
areas as: (1) literature that expands or updates the value creation paradigm, (2)
literature on regulation and value creation, (3) negotiation theory literature, and
(4) literature on business law education.
First, one broadly-construed line of literature has expanded or updated the
value-creation model, such as by adding an understanding of the importance of
reputation, legal system costs, relational contracting, and additional perspectives
such as a sociological lens.13 My co-panelist, Professor Karl Okamoto expanded
upon the idea of business lawyers as reputational intermediaries between their
clients and third parties, highlighting the importance of reputation as a source of

11

Gilson, supra note 1, at 301.
Id. at 303-06.
13
Relational contracting refers to contracts entered into with the expectation of an ongoing
relationship and the idea that the prospect of future exchanges will shape parties’ interactions. See,
e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089
(1981); Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
12
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value in business practice.14 Edward Bernstein, a practicing business lawyer, has
argued that it is unrealistic to ignore “legal system” costs.15 In practice, parties
have to deal with delay, litigation and enforcement costs, and deviations from
anticipated outcomes. Professor Lisa Bernstein, building on the work of
sociologist Mark Suchman, observed that the economic perspective of
transactional lawyering could be fruitfully supplemented by sociological findings,
and that the Silicon Valley lawyer, who plays multiple legal and extralegal roles
in a relational contracting setting, could be understood as an example of a
transaction cost engineer.16 Further, she concluded that this sociological lens
provided a lesson for business lawyers that “failure to consider the existence of
extralegal and social norm-based constraints on behavior” could lead them to
make the mistake of “overlawyering” transactions.17
Mark Suchman’s work has added interdisciplinary texture to
understanding what Silicon Valley business lawyers do—they don’t simply assist
in isolated transactions, but rather are part of constructing the cultural context
itself in which these transactions are “comprehensible, desirable, feasible, and
meaningful.”18 Professor Suchman suggests that a sociological account of the
Silicon Valley business lawyer could support the transaction-cost engineer
paradigm, but notes that what is seen as “value creation” activity might instead be
lawyers acting as “touts and bouncers for the prevailing legal regime.”19 My copanelist, Professor Jeff Lipshaw, has similarly suggested the alternative
explanation that business lawyers have cultural significance and are part of the
ritual of business transactions.20 Along the lines of work that improves our
understanding of what Silicon Valley or start-up lawyers do, Paul Gompers and
Josh Lerner have elucidated how lawyers have engineered structures and
contracting forms to accommodate client needs in the venture capital space.21

14

Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15 (1995).
Edward Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract
Lawyer’s View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189, 198 (1995).
16
Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239
(1994) (discussing and building upon Mark C. Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and
Venture Capital Funds as Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (1994)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University) (on file with Robert Crown Law Library at
Stanford University)).
17
Id. at 255.
18
Mark C. Suchman, Translation Costs: A Comment on Sociology and Economics, 74 OR. L.
REV. 257, 263-64 (1995).
19
Id. at 267-68.
20
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Beetles, Frogs, and Lawyers: The Scientific Demarcation Problem in the
Gilson Theory of Value Creation, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 139, 140-41 (2009).
21
PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2d ed. 2004); see also Steven
Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281 (2003).
15
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Others scholars, like Professor George Dent, have also offered broader
analyses of what business lawyers do. He has discussed business lawyers as
“enterprise architects,” pointing out that much of what business lawyers do is not
transactions like mergers and acquisitions (M&A), but rather relational contracts,
strategic alliances, and internal transactions such as reorganizations, financings,
and executive employment contracts, as well as advisory and compliance work.22
Scholars like Brian Quinn, Steven Davidoff Solomon, and Christina Sautter have
also built on Professor Gilson’s work, perhaps not explicitly framed as
extensions, but by adding to the literature on deal structures and terms. They
have done the important work of studying the tracks of the beetles themselves,
such as by “describing the good and the bad of transactional lawyering” in the
context of private equity,23 and examining how business lawyers handle
contracting obstacles such as asset-specific investments and specific deal
provisions.24
Professors Gordon Smith and Brayden King have added
organizational theories (resource, learning, identity, and institutional theory) “to
supplement—and in some instances, perhaps, challenge” economic accounts,
showing that business lawyers serve multiple purposes and have multiple ways of
creating value.25
Here it’s worth noting, as Professor Gilson did today, that a line of
literature has challenged finance theory such as the capital assets pricing model
and the underpinnings of rational economic decisionmaking—for example,
literature showing that asset value may be affected by noise, network effects,
information cascades, or other factors.26 Scholars such as Professor Robert
Thompson have noted, building on Professor Gilson’s work, that this has created
the potential for additional insights for lawyering, such as that lawyers in a
positive feedback economy may add value by paying attention to the timing of
deals.27
Second, a line of literature has shown that regulation is a rich area of
study and an important realm for broadening our understanding of what business
lawyers do, particularly as the administrative state has increased substantially in
22

George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279, 286-95
(2009).
23
Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 486 (2009).
24
See, e.g., Christina M. Sautter, Auction Theory and Standstill Agreements: Dealing with
Friends and Foes in a Sale of Corporate Control, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 521 (2013); Steven M.
Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681 (2013); Brian J.M. Quinn,
Asset Specificity and Transaction Structures: A Case Study of @Home Corporation, 15 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 77 (2010).
25
D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2
(2009).
26
Robert B. Thompson, Value Creation by Lawyers Within Relational Contracts and in Noisy
Environments, 74 OR. L. REV. 315, 316 (1995).
27
Id. at 324-25.
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the past few decades. Professor Steven Schwarcz’s empirical work, which
surveyed transactional lawyers and their clients, challenged the idea of
transactional lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” or “reputational
intermediaries,” by suggesting that transactional lawyers primarily add value by
reducing regulatory costs.28 This work couldn’t be provided by just any kind of
professional; it requires legal training. Professor Schwarcz asserts this may help
explain why business lawyers are concentrated in transaction-regulatory areas
such as securities law, M&A, banking, structured finance, and project finance,
and why “transactional lawyers are (and should be) secure in their professions.”29
Professor Victor Fleischer has shown that regulatory arbitrage—
structuring a deal to avoid regulatory costs without unduly changing the
substance of the underlying economics—should be added to our understanding of
what business lawyers do, in addition to deal quarterbacking and acting as
transaction-cost engineers.30
Professor Fleischer’s work adds depth and
complexity to the tradeoff between engineering transaction costs and regulatory
costs that Professor Gilson earlier identified—this helps Professor Gilson’s Value
Creation framework better fit with what we observe in real-world deals which
aren’t always efficiently structured to minimize transaction costs.31 As Professor
Fleischer has described, “deal lawyers engineer regulatory costs as well as
Coasean transaction costs, balancing the two against the shifting backdrop of
legal, business, ethical, professional, and political concerns.”32 Adding regulatory
arbitrage to the mix raises the possibility that some of what business lawyers do
might create value for their clients but reduce overall social welfare because some
regulatory arbitrage could be viewed as a transfer from the state to private clients,
perhaps particularly those who are wealthy, sophisticated, and politically wellconnected.33
Professor Nestor Davidson’s work has added that the government may be
“more than a neutral referee” and that clients may seek value beyond economic
metrics.34 His focus is the public-private transactional context, in which lawyers
perform what he terms “regulatory translation”—that is, translating abstract
policy goals into private ordering mechanisms.35 The key point he adds is the
notion that transactional lawyers in this context play a role in pursuing noneconomic goals for their clients and thus the concept of value should
28

Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 486 (2007).
29
Id. at 506-07.
30
Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229-35 (2010).
31
Id. at 231-32.
32
Id. at 236.
33
See id. at 234, 280-83, 288.
34
Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public—Private Transactions, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 937, 941 (2009).
35
Id. at 937.

BLJ_15.1_POLLMAN_MACRO_HZFINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Ed. 1]

4/28/2015 5:22 PM

Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Where Are We and Where Are We Going? 19

correspondingly expand as these lawyers “hold the potential not only to make the
pie bigger, but to help bake a very different pie.”36
Third, literature has developed in negotiation theory, by Professor Robert
Mnookin and many others, that adds important insights into the negotiation
process through which value might be created and the strategic behavior,
psychological barriers, and other obstacles that might lead to negotiation failure.37
Fourth, and finally, literature and debate on transactional and business
law education has largely expanded and been inspired by the Value Creation
article we’re commemorating today.38 This is likely an area with which many in
the audience are familiar and others on the panel will be speaking about, so with
apologies to those whose work there isn’t time to highlight today, I’ll turn now to
the last portion of my comments.
III. WHERE ARE WE GOING?
One of the key lasting ideas of the Value Creation article is to bring
academic theory to bear on the practice of business lawyering. Is there a deeper
understanding of why business lawyers do what they do and a conceptual
framework that allows us to better understand the ways in which their activities
create value? If the past is a guide for the future, scholars will continue to find
points that require further elucidation, additional ways to criticize and broaden
underlying theory, and continue to expand the description of transactional
lawyering practice and value.
Measurement continues to be a challenge, however; lawyers and clients
have difficulty knowing when or how much incremental value lawyers are
adding. From my own transactional practice experience, I’m particularly
interested in how contractual terms are actually priced or valued as the deal price
doesn’t continuously change as lawyers negotiate a contract. We don’t have a
36

Id. at 943.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN
DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreward: Business
Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV.
754 (1984).
38
Contributors to this interesting and important literature are too numerous to acknowledge; for a
small sample, see for example, Gillian K. Hadfield, Equipping the Guys in the Garage, 70 MD. L.
REV. 484 (2011); Eric J. Gouvin, Teaching Business Lawyering in Law Schools: A Candid
Assessment of the Challenges and Some Suggestions for Moving Ahead, 78 UMKC L. REV. 429
(2009); Tina L. Stark, Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 223 (2004); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal
Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97 (2001); Therese Maynard, Teaching Professionalism: The
Lawyer as a Professional, 34 GA. L. REV. 895 (2000); Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Delaware
Corporation Law and Transaction Cost Engineering, 34 GA. L. REV. 929 (2000); Steven H.
Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241 (1997).
37
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full account of the pricing of contractual terms, but this may simply not be
possible.
What is possible, and I think important, would be work that explores the
implications of the big picture shifts that have occurred in the past 30 years.
First, as others have noted, regulation has substantially increased. The regulatory
picture is more complex, particularly with globalization, requiring a huge amount
of legal expertise to navigate. Moreover, the regulatory environment is
frequently changing—creating additional challenges for the business lawyer, and
often opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. Second, we’ve seen the rise of inhouse counsel and a more powerful general counsel role.39 Third, great strides in
technology have enabled greater, and more efficient, communication and
collaboration. Technology has also made information more easily available; yet
this is not always a positive. A deluge of information is not useful. Relevant,
customized information and services, problem-solving ability, communication
and drafting skills, and judgment are valuable.
So what kind of work is being done or might be done to explore the
implications of these changes? Part of the conversation could move more
specifically to how different types of business lawyers add value—in-house
lawyers versus outside counsel, and how they can effectively leverage other nonlawyer resources, as well as improve the quality of contract designs. This could
be theorizing value creation in a world where business law services are
disaggregated between in-house counsel, outside counsel, and others.
Academics and those with entrepreneurial spirit could also help continue
to figure out how technology could be further embraced for overall value
creation. Could the pie expand if a menu of model contracts became more
standardized through open source or crowdfunding dynamics? Some recent work
has started to explore contracts as innovations and how contracts govern interfirm
relationships where innovation and entrepreneurship occurs.40 Would settled
39

See, e.g., E. NORMAN VEASEY & CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO, INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL: THE
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 30 (2012) (examining how the role of general counsel
has expanded in corporate affairs with increased regulation and the complexity of the global
economy); Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33
J. CORP. L. 497, 497, 499 (2008) (discussing “the shift from outside to in-house ‘transactional
lawyering’” and providing empirical evidence “suggesting that in-house lawyers may now be
performing work as high in quality as outside lawyers and that the reputation value of outside
lawyers may be significantly diminishing”).
40
See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2013) (analyzing
contractual innovations and their potential sources); Matthew C. Jennejohn, Collaboration,
Innovation, and Contract Design, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83 (2008) (examining how firms use
contracts to govern their collaborations and establish a learning process between collaborators);
George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and Innovation in
Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177 (2013) (discussing how technological advances
have led to standardization and commoditization of contracts and the potential for innovation
through peer production of contracts).
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standard versions add efficiency, freeing up lawyers to work on customized
innovations, regulatory navigation, and the value-adding ancillary services they
can provide? Along these lines, scholars might study who creates contractual
innovations in various industries, how contractual innovations are disseminated,
and how they become widely used.
One of the many virtues of the Value Creation article, in my view, was its
combination of practical and theoretical perspectives—it examined practice in a
field, tried to make sense of it, and showed how it might be done better. This has
influenced the literature that has followed and the questions Professor Gilson
posed 30 years ago will continue to have lasting impact.

